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NONCONSENSUAL SUBSURETYSHIP
MORTON C. CAMPBELL "
PART ONE
The term subsuretyship may properly be used to denote a situation in
which one person, A, is surety for another, P, and a third person, B, is surety
for both. P is the principal, A the surety, and B the subsurety. If there
is mutual agreement, expressed or implied, between A and B concerning
their relation, this agreement controls and their relation is consensual. If
they have entered into no such agreement, or no such agreement sufficiently
manifested, their relation arises by operation of law; it is nonconsensual.
It makes no difference that each willingly undertook risk, personal or real,
to the creditor or obligee, or that each has unwillingly incurred such risk,
or that one has willingly and the other unwillingly incurred risk. In all these
situations the relation between A and B is nonconsensual, since it does not
rest on mutual consent.
The cases generally fall within three broad categories. In the first A
is admittedly surety for P, and B for A; it is demonstrable that by operation
of law B is surety for P. The consequence is that a relation of subsurety-
ship exists, although not supported by any agreement between A and B. In
the second category A and B are admittedly sureties for P; it is often diffi-
cult to determine what relation the law creates between the two; if one is
made surety for the other rather than with the other, nonconsensual sub-
suretyship exists among the three. Most instances of nonconsensual sub-
suretyship fall within this category. In the third, while A and B have under-
taken risk for different principals, that is, for P-i and P-2, respectively, the
situation may be such that by operation of law A is surety for P-2 as well as
P-l, and B for P-i as well as P-2, the result being that each is surety for both
principals. A and B may be made co-sureties. On the other hand, con-
siderations of equity and good conscience may require that B be surety for
A, in which case nonconsensual subsuretyship is present, P-i and P-2 being
principals, A surety, and B subsurety.
(I) Relation Between Surety for a Surety and the Latter's Principal
A surety for a surety is necessarily surety for the latter's principal.
Thus, if A is surety for P to C and if for a consideration B gives his note
to C to secure performance on the part of A, or becomes bail for A in a civil
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action I or his surety on a forthcoming bond - or an appeal bond,3 or mort-
gages his land or other property to secure performance by A, B is surety
for P as well as for A and the situation is one of subsuretyship, notwith-
standing the absence of any consent thereto or knowledge thereof on the
part of P. The reasons are: (i) that some relation must be established
between B and P in order that the ultimate incidence of loss will not be left
to accident, or to caprice or collusion on the part of C; and (2) that, of the
conceivable ways in which the law may relate B and P, that is, as co-princi-
pals, principal and surety, and surety and principal, respectively, the last is
the only tenable one. It merely gives to B, if he pays C, recourse against P
through subrogation to the right of C, when B could at least attack P indi-
rectly by striking A and so throwing him against P. Moreover, the other
two suggested relations are untenable because if C should recover from P
the latter would have redress from B in whole or in part, B from A, and A
from P-a process involving not only circuity of action or suit but also
improper indirect attack by P on A.
4
For like reasons, if B is surety for A to C, and P later becomes principal
for A, for example, by agreeing with A for a consideration to assume the
obligation of A to C, so that P becomes bound to C as creditor-beneficiary,
B is surety for P as well as for A and the situation is one of subsuretyship,
with the result that, as in the case last discussed, B is subrogated to the rights
of C against P as well as against A, and P is not subrogated either fully or
contributively to the rights of C against A or against B.5 If in addition S
undertakes an obligation to A as surety for the performance of P's agree-
ment, the order of ultimate liability will be P., S, A and B; so also, if there
is some other reason in equity and good conscience why the loss resulting
from P's nonperformance should ultimately fall on S rather than on A; for
example, when the undertaking of S, while running to C, is, by interpreta-
tion 6 or statutory provision, for the benefit of A as well as C; or when S
and A (or B) so expressly or impliedly agree.7
i. Goddard v. Whyte, 2 Giff. 449 (Ch. 186o) (B subrogated to mortgage held by C on
property of P).
2. Nelson v. Century Indemnity Co., 65 F. (2d) 765, 768 (C. C. A. 9tb, 1933) ; Leake v.
Ferguson, 2 Gratt. 419, 434 (Va. 1846) (B subrogated to judgment lien of C on property
of P).
3. City Trust etc. Co. v. Haaslocher, io App. Div. 415, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1022 (1st Dep't
1go5).
4. See Campbell, Protection Against Indirect Attack, HARVARD LEGAAL ESSAYS (934) 3.
5. Frederick Snare Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 2oi App. Div. 505, 194 N. Y. Supp.
353 (ist Dep't 1922).
6. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Equitable Surety Co., 145 Minn. 326, 177 N. W. 137
(i92O) (B and X were sureties, respectively, on bonds given to the state by A, a holder of a
timber-cutting permit, and by P, his assignee; the assignee defaulted in payment). There is
doubt in the writer's mind as to whether the latter bond should be so interpreted; it ran to
and was exacted by the state. The decision can be better sustained on other reasoning: the
intervention of S brought about the assignment and so resulted in a variation of the risk of
B; while A participated in the assignment and hence might be held to be merely a co-surety
for P, B did not consent to the assignment and so should be regarded as surety for S.
7. Bender v. George, 92 Pa. 36, 39 (1879) (B procured the assignment of a lease to P
with S as surety).
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Again, on similar reasoning, a surety for a sheriff (or a constable) is
necessarily surety for a deputy sheriff, a judgment creditor, or a judgment
debtor who is related to the sheriff as a principal; 8 and a surety for a tax
collector is also surety for a delinquent tax-payer, if the last named is princi-
pal in respect to the collector.9
It follows that the subsurety, B, is not restricted to claiming through 4
the latter's rights of recourse against P but is fully subrogated to the rights
of C against P or in his property,10 and may enforce those rights notwith-
standing any defence or set-off which P might have asserted against A." It
is to be observed that P is placed in no worse position than if B had not be-
come surety.
12
On the other hand, if A is surety for P to C and C receives the bond
or note of A, for the performance of which B is surety, in full satisfaction
of the principal debt and not in conditional payment thereof or by way of
security therefor, B is not subrogated to the former rights of C against P
or in his property. B was never a surety for P, since they were not simulta-
neously bound to C; nor can he be accounted the payer of C, since it is A
who must be so regarded inasmuch as he is bound first or last on the substi-
tuted bond or note.13  At most, therefore, B is remitted to attack through
A, 1 4 the result being that he is subject to a defence or set-off available to P
against A. 15
(II) Relation between Sureties for the Same Principal Performance in the
Absence of Agreement Inter Se
In the absence of agreement expressed or implied between two or more
sureties for the same principal performance, or, it seems, in the case of such
an agreement insufficiently manifested, the law creates such relation between
them as justice requires. Such cases mostly fall within three classes: Class
I, in which the sureties respectively have had consistent understandings with
the creditor or principal as to the relation of the sureties inter se; Class II,
in which the sureties have not had understandings with the creditor. or prin-
8. See infra appropriate sub-topic, part two.
9. See infra appropriate sub-topic, part two.
io. Leake v. Ferguson, 2 Gratt. 419, 434 (Va. 1846) (subsurety subrogated to judgment
lien of C on realty of P conveyed by him to G).
II. Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 Pac. 287 (1914) ; CAMPBELL, CASES ON- BILLS AND
NoTEs (1928) 785 (defence of rescission). Contra: Putnam v. Tash, 78 Mass. 121 (0858)
(failure of consideration). In Ursini v. Piazza, ioi Conn. 736, 127 At. 350 (1925), set-off
was allowed, but the plaintiff erroneously limited his claim to "subrogation" to the right of A.
12. But if P acquired a defence against A (e. g., because of funds prematurely received
by the latter from the former in payment or exoneration), and B thereafter became bound
as surety before default, it is submitted that B would not be surety for A, but rather P and
B would be sureties for A and co-sureties with each other.
13. Elwood v. Deifendorf, 5 Barb. 398, 408 (N. Y. 1848) (arguendo).
14. It was recognized in Elwood v. Deifendorf, 5 Barb. 398, 413 (N. Y. 1848), that B,
surety for A for the amount of the debt and certain costs, would be entitled to A's rights
against P therefor.
i5. New York State Bank v. Fletcher, 5 Wend. 85 (N. Y. 1830) (defence of payment).
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cipal; and Clais III, in which they have had inconsistent understandings
with creditor or principal.
Class I: Consistent Understandings between the Respective Sureties and the
Creditor or Principal
If A has an understanding with C, the creditor, or P, the principal, or
with both, merely that he shall be surety for P (and all the more if the under-
standing be that he shall be a surety interposed between P and B), and B has
an understanding with C or P 16 that he shall be surety for both P and A,1
the law relates A and B as surety and subsurety, respectively. Thus legal
effect is given to the understanding of B and no violence is done to that of A.
Such understandings may be written or oral.
In the leading case of Craythorne v. Swinburne,18 the understandings
of the sureties were indicated by the form of the respective bonds, A having
joined with P in a bond to C conditioned on a certain payment and B, ap-.
parently without the knowledge of P or A, having executed a bond to C
conditioned on payment "by P and A, or either of them." Thus it appeared
that A willingly undertook risk as surety for P, but B as surety for P and
A. They were held to be related accordingly, and hence A failed in a suit
for contributiof brought against B.1
So also, when such understandings exist between the respective sureties
and the principal, the relation is that of surety and subsurety, the result being
that the subsurety, if he pays the creditor, will be entitled to full recovery
I6. An understanding with any other party to the transaction, e. g., a third surety,
should be equally effective.
17. And so, it seems, if for P and a surety whose identity is not then disclosed or de-
termined.
i8. I4 Ves. i6o (Ch. 18o7).
ig. Accord: Hamilton v. Johnston, 82 Ill. 39 (1876) (B was an irregular indorser and A
a joint maker with M, the principal; held in Illinois before the Negotiable Instruments Law
that an irregular indorser was bound prima facie as guarantor of payment by the makers;
judgment in full was given for B against A in an action for money paid); Robertson v.
Deatherage, 82 Ill. 511 (1876) (A and B joint makers with principal; B had oral understand-
ing with creditor that he should be surety for A) ; Pope v. Hoefs, 140 Minn. 443, 168 N. W.
584 (I918) (same) ; Robison v. Lyle, io Barb. 512 (N. Y. i85I) (oral understanding of B
with creditor) ; Phillips v. Plato, 42 Hun 189 (N. Y. 1886) (B wrote a guaranty of pay-
ment on a note after A had indorsed it for the maker's accommodation; the guaranty was
written above the indorsement; guaranty interpreted as one for performance by the indorser
as well as the maker; held A was not entitled to contribution) ; Keith v. Goodwin, 31 Vt. 268,
275, 277 (1858) (B guaranteed payment of note jointly made by M and A, his surety; held
that B was subsurety) ; In re Denton's Estate, [i9o4] 2 Ch. 178 (A was surety jointly and
severally bound to C for and with P, a mortgagor; B corporation was bound to C on a policy
of mortgage insurance for payment of the mortgage debt, the policy and the application in-
corporated therein containing terms which were interpreted as importing that B was under-
taking liability for P and A).
And see Frew v. Scoular, IOI Neb. 131, 162 N. W. 496, Note L. R. A. I917F, 1074
(917). P, A and B successively executed a bond and mortgage, the oral understanding of
P and B with the creditor being that B should not be personally liable for the mortgage debt.
It vas held that the parol evidence rule was not applicable in this suit for contribution brought
by A against B, and that testimony of the facts above stated should have been received. The
decision is a logical extension of the rule of Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. i6o (Ch. I8o7).
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from the surety 20 and the surety, if he pays the creditor, will have no recourse
against the subsurety.
21
If P, the principal, and A and B, his sureties, join in making a note to
C. their signatures appearing in that order, and that of B being accompanied
by the word "surety," or the like, the import is merely that B is surety for
P, 22 but if by the words "surety for the above," or equivalent language, it is
prima facie imported that B is surety for both the preceding parties.23
Properly included in Class I are those cases of successive accommo-
dating parties to negotiable instruments in which the obligation of B, one
of the accommodating parties, to the creditor, is conditioned on nonpayment
by A, the other accommodating party. Such an obligation imports an
understanding between B and the creditor that B shall be surety for A and,
in the absence of an inconsistent understanding between A and the creditor
or the principal, the relation of surety and subsurety is created between A
and B, respectively. Consequently, on taking up the bill from the creditor,
B may recover thereon in full from A, and A on taking up the bill is denied
even contributive recovery from B. Accordingly, it is generally held that B,
an accommodating indorser-payee or subsequent indorser, may recover in
full on the bill or note from A, an accommodating acceptor or maker, 2 and
A will be denied even contributive recovery from B.25  The result would be
no different if, instead of his indorsement being regular in form as it was in
the situation last discussed, B had not been within the tenor of the instru-
ment and hence his indorsement had been irregular.2 6  Likewise, if B is an
accommodating drawer and A the accommodating acceptor of a bill, B may
20. Sherman v. Black, 49 Vt. ig8 (1876). Contra: Stovall v. Border Grange Bank, 78
Va. 188, 192 (1883).
21. Hunt v. Chambliss, 15 Miss. 532, 539, 543 (1846) (A and B signed as sureties; B
had oral agreement of subsuretyship with principal) ; Oldham v. Broom, 28 Ohio St. 41, 53
(1875) ; see Paul v. Berry, 78 Ill. 158 (1875). Contra: Norton v. Coons, 3 Denio 130 (N.
Y. 1846), aff'd, 6 N. Y. 33 (1851) ; but see Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462, 467 (1855).
So also in Hecker v. Mahler, 64 Ohio St. 398, 6o N. E. 555 (1go) (alternative decision),
an understanding of a promisor with one principal was held to control his relation with other
co-principals.
22. Baldwin v. Fleming, 9o Ind. 177, 18o (1883) ; M'Gee v. Prouty, 50 Mass. 547 (1845);
Robison v. Lyle, io Barb. 512 (N. Y. 1851).
23. Lord v. Moody, 41 Me. 127 (1856).
24. Gillespie v. Campbell, 39 Fed. 724 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1889) ; Laubach v. Pursell, 35 N.
J. L. 434 (1872) ; Gomez v. Lazarus, 16 N. C. 205, 218 (1828) ; Williams v. Bosson & Bros.,
iI Ohio 62 (1841). And see Pender v. Cook, 300 Pa. 468, 15o Atl. 892 (193o).
25. Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 Ind. 52 (1878) (blank for payee filled with name of B
after A had signed as co-maker with the principal and B had indorsed his name) ; Mulcare
v. Welch, i6o Mass. 58, 35 N. E. 97 (1893); Hillegas v. Stephenson, 75 Mo. 118 (1881);
Smith v. Smith, 16 N. C. 173 (1828) ; Dawson v. Pettway, 2o N. C. 396 (1839). But see
Slaymaker v. Gundacker, io S. & R. 75, 81 (Pa. 1823) ; Reynolds v. Wheeler, io C. B. (N. s.)
561 (1861) (first surety was acceptor of original bill and drawer of renewal bill; second
surety was indorser of both; held first surety entitled to contribution).
26. Hamilton v. Johnston, 82 Ill. 39 (1876) ; Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 668, I00 S. E.
666, 669 (1919) (decided under Negotiable Instruments Law § 68). Before the Negotiable
Instruments Law a different result would have been reached in Massachusetts or any other
state in which the irregular indorser of a note was bound as co-maker, for there A and B
would have been co-makers and prima fade co-sureties.
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have full recovery from A and A will have none from B. 2 7  In all these
situations, the fact that B's signature preceded that of A, in point of time
or position, does not prevent B from being subsurety.
2s
It should make no difference that the principal first procured the signa-
ture of A by fraud, and having later gotten the signature of B without fraud
negotiated the instrument to the creditor, a holder in due course. Even
here A is surety and B subsurety, inasmuch as B incurred liability to C rely-
ing on the prior signature of A in good faith and without notice of the fraud;
hence on taking up the instrument B succeeds to the effective right of the
creditor against A. 29
A variation of the cases thus far discussed in this section occurs when.&
already has effective rights against P as principal and A as surety, and
transfers those rights with assumption of liability to C. Here also the situa-
tion is one of subsuretyship; no injustice is being done to A, since he will-
ingly assumed responsibility for P; and justice to B requires that on making
C whole he be placed in no worse position than he formerly occupied, and
so have a right for full recovery against A as well as.against P. This is
obviously true when B is payee or indorsee of a negotiable instrument and
transfers it with guaranty or by indorsement, 30 and also in a case like Darrah
v. Osborne,31 in which, M being indebted to B and B to C, B procured from
21 a note jointly made by him and A as his surety payable to C, and later
delivered it to C, himself signing the note as joint maker at C's request. it
was held that B was entitled to full reimbursement from A, and properly so,
since B, as "remitter," already had substantial rights against A and k.
-3 2
There may be consistent agreements making for co-suretyship as well
as for subsuretyship. Thus, if A has an understanding with the creditor or
principal that he shall be surety with B, and B that he shall be surety with
A, the relation of co-suretyship results.33
It should be borne in mind that this rule pertaining to negotiable instru-
ments has no application when there is a sufficiently manifested agreement
between the sureties, oral or written, expressed or implied in fact, fixing a
27. See Barnet v. Young, 29 Ohio St. 7, II (1875), distinguishing Douglas v. Waddle, i
Ohio 413 (1824), a case of successive indorsers.
28. Barnet v. Young, 29 Ohio St. 7 (1875).
29. It was so held in Reinhart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352, 16 Atl. 126 (1888) (A was the
defrauded accommodation maker; P, the defrauding principal, was the indorsing payee; and
B the subsequent indorser. B's case was strengthened by the fact that P represented to B
that the paper was business paper, so that B justifiably believed that he was surety for P and
the latter for A).
3o. Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass. 179 (1868) ; Schneider v. Mueller, 82 N. J. L. 503, 81 At.
863 (911).
31. 7 N.J.L. 71 (I823).
32. For the rights of a remitter, see Moore, The Right of the Remitter of a Bill or Note
(192o) 20 COL L. REv. 749, 751, 753; Beutel, Rights of Remitters and Other Owners Not
W1ithin the Tenor of Negotiable Instruments (1928) 12 MiNN. L. REV. 584.
33. Hagerthy v. Phillips, 83 Me. 336, 22 At. 223 (1891) (previous agreement by each
with principal to sign original note as surety if the others would, nothing being said about
order of signing).
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different relation between them. By virtue of such an agreement A and B
may be co-sureties, 34 or B may be surety and A subsurety.
35
Class II. No Understanding with Principal or Creditor
If each of the sureties intends that he shall be surety but does not con-
template that there is or shall be another surety, or though so contemplating
has no understanding expressed or implied in fact with the principal or
creditor as to what the relation between himself and the other surety shall
be, the relation created by the law is that of co-suretyship. 36 So also, if one
of the sureties does not so contemplate and the other though so contemplating
has no such understanding, the relation is that of co-suretyship.
37
Class II. No Understanding with Principal or Creditor-(A) The Problem
Presented by Successive Parties to Negotiable Instruments
The question now arises whether the fact that the sureties are severaI
and successive parties to a negotiable instrument constitutes an exception
to the general rule of co-suretyship just stated, so that the first surety is
surety for the principal, and the second is subsurety. The English cases
answer this question in the negative. 38 Most American cases answer it in
the affirmative.39
One reason frequently given for the American view is that such accom-
modating parties normally intend that the order of liability inter se shall be
the same as if they were successive parties to "business" paper, and that
the law relates them accordingly in the absence of agreement between them
to the contrary. Obviously, it is difficult to demonstrate that the parties
normally have that intention. Furthermore, the reason is of limited appli-
cation; it stops short of the cases in which any of the sureties is an irregular
34. Schlosburg v. Tanenbaum, 38 Ga. App. 641, 144 S. E. 804 (1928) ; Denton v. Lytle,
4 Bush 597 (Ky. 1869) (inference of co-suretyship regarded as arising from the fact that
each eventually paid one-half to the creditor) ; Gillam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424
(1925) ; Marquardt's Estate, 251 Pa. 73, 95 AtI. 917 (1915) (notes made by A, and indorsed
by B, payee, and by C, D, and E, all directors of principal corporation, in pursuance of mutual
agreement to indorse) ; Arto v. Jester, 274 S. W. 984 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (continuing
agreement of co-suretyship governing renewal note) ; and see Exum v. Mayfield, 297 S. W.
6o7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
35. Martin v. Marshall, 6o Vt. 321, 13 AtI. 42o (1888) (A signed first at the request of
and for the benefit of B, who was obligated to the principal to procure discount of the note;
inference of agreement by B to indemnify A) ; Handsaker v. Pedersen, 71 Wash. 218, 223,
128 Pac. 230, 232 (1912). See Ehret v. Basso, 4 N. J. Misc. 69, 131 Atl. 677 (1926).
36. 21 R. C. L. 1132; IO Am. St. Rep. 639; 2 WMIuisTox, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1277. A
leading case is Deering v. Winchelsea, 2 B. & P. 270 (1787), in which the sureties were
bound on separate bonds for faithful accounting of the principal; it was held that the plaintiff
surety was entitled to contributory exoneration.
37. Stovall v. Border Grange Bank, 78 Va. 188, 194 (1883).
38. Reynolds v. Wheeler, io C. B. (N. s.) 561 (i86i), approved in Macdonald v. Whit-
field, 8 App. Cas. 733, 744, 746, 749 (P. C. 1883) (alternative decision) ; Godsell v. Lloyd, 27
T. L. R. 383 (1911). Accord: Cockburn v. Johnston, 15 Grant 577 (Ch. Upper Can.
1869). But an agreement between the sureties that one shall be surety for the other as well
as for the principal controls. Batson v. King, 4 H. & N. 739 (Ex. 1859) (indorser agreeing
to be liable to drawer).
39. Cases cited passim in this and the following sub-topics.
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indorser, for not being within the tenor he could not be a "business" in-
dorser, that is, an indorser by way of transfer. A second reason, of general
application, is that the first surety normally signs on the faith of the prin-
cipal's signature and hence relying on having recourse against him only,
while the second signs on the faith of both the former signatures and hence
in reliance on full recourse against the first surety as well as the principal.
Whether originally sureties did usually so rely is more or less conjectural,
but in the many states in which it has been received the American rule is so
well known that such reliance is now doubtless the normal course and hence
continuance of the rule and its recognition by Section 68 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law is abundantly justified.
Of these two reasons the second is the more general and seemingly the
more cogent. It follows necessarily that the order of signatures in point of
time is controlling as between the sureties. 40 Section 68 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law so provides in the case of successive indorsements.A In-
deed, even though the first reason be preferred, order in time may well be
regarded as determinative between the sureties, just as it would be in the case
of regular, transferring indorsements. 42  Order in point of position is
important, however, as affording a presumption of corresponding order in
time, which presumption may be rebutted by written or oral evidence.43
The American rule has application only to cases in which the sureties
are severally bound to the creditor. Hence the preliminary inquiry is
whether they are so bound. For, if jointly or jointly and severally bound,
they- stand in the relation of co-sureties, in the absence of a sufficiently
manifested agreement between them to the contrary. 44 Thus, if M makes
a note payable to the order of A and B, and they indorse their names on it
for the accommodation of M, who negotiates it to H, one is constrained to
infer that A and B indorse jointly, since otherwise the creditor would not
be brought within the tenor of the instrument, and hence in the absence of a
sufficiently manifested agreement between them to the contrary they are
co-sureties, whatever may be the order of their signatures in time or in posi-
tion on the instrument.43  On the other hand, if M makes a note payable
to the order of A, and A and then B indorse their names on it, it is inferable
40. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1262. Contra: 2 RANDOLPH, COMMERCIAL PAPER
(2d ed. 1899) § 740.
41. Deutsch v. Pocoroba, io8 N. J. L. 279, 158 Atl. 504 (1932).
42. Redden v. Lambert, 112 La. 740, 36 So. 668 (19o4). But see Pender v. Cook, 300 Pa.
468, 471, 15o Atl. 892, 893 (1930).
43. Prestenbach v. Mansur, 14 La. App. 429, 125 So. 310, 129 So. 445 (930). See also
next sub-topic, paragraph (5) (a) and (b).
44. Hurlbut v. Quigley, x8o Cal. 265, &8o Pac. 613 (11), (919) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 343;
Owens v. Greenlee, 68 Colo. 114, 188 Pac. 721 (i92o) ; Houck v. Graham, xo6 Ind. 195, 200,
6 N. E. 594, 598 (1886)-; McKee v. Campbell, 27 Mich. 497, 499 (1873) ; Shufelt v. Moore,
93 Mich. 564, 53 N. W. 722 (1892) ; Eisley v. Horr, 42 Neb. 3, 5, 6o N. W. 365, 366 (1894).
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1261, 1262.
45. Bunker v. Osborn, 132 Cal. 48o, 64 Pac. 853 (igoi); Lane v. Stacy, 9o Mass. 41
(1864) ; Steckel v. Steckel, 28 Pa. 233 (1857).
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that A and B indorse severally, since a joint indorsement would be inartistic
and perhaps insufficient to change the tenor. Both these indorsements of
A and B are regular in form since that of A, the payee, preceded that of B;
hence, under the American view, there being no agreement to the contrary
between them, they occupy the relation of surety and subsurety, respectively,
so that on taking up the bill from the holder B, or his transferee, may recover
in full in an action thereon against A.46 If, however, A, B, and also C had
in turn indorsed their names in the case last considered, while one is led to
infer that A indorsed severally, 7 he might well doubt whether B and C
intended to be bound to the creditor jointly, jointly and severally, or only
severally. The law solves the difficulty by binding them severally, in the
absence of sufficiently manifested intention to be bound in either of the
other ways, and thus brings the rule of subsuretyship into operation. 43
Likewise, if M makes a note payable to the order of H, and A and B indorse
their names on it before delivery to H, it is often a difficult question of fact
whether A and B indorse jointly, jointly and severally, or merely severally.
Here again the law intervenes and binds them severally, 49 but not when
there is a sufficiently manifested intention to the contrary.50
Class II. No Understanding with Creditor or Principal-(B) Application
of the American Rule Governing Successive Parties to Negotiable
Instruments
In applying the American rule, several classes of cases are encoun-
tered:
(i) Where A is acceptor of a bill and B the drawer, indorsing payee
or subsequent indorser, the situation is prima facie one of subsuretyship;
likewise when A is maker of a note and B indorsing payee or subsequent in-
dorser. These cases are more properly and more fully treated as instances
of Class I, supra.
(2) Where A is drawer of a bill and B is the indorsing payee or a
subsequent indorser, both signing for the accommodation of another party
(usually the acceptor), A is surety and B subsurety,5 in the absence of a
sufficiently manifested agreement between them to the contrary. It is to be
observed that this situation is not governed by Section 68 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
46. Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass. 214 (I867). See next sub-topic, paragraph (3)."
47. Wolf v. Hostetter, 182 Pa. 292, 37 Atl. 988 (1897) (holding that on taking up the
note C could not maintain an action against A and B jointly).
48. Lewis v. Monahan, 173 Mass. 122, 53 N. E. 150 (1899).
49. Porter v. Huie, 94 Ark. 333, 126 S. W. io6g, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) lO39 (igio).
5o. Hurlbut v. Quigley, i8o Cal. 265, 18o Pac. 613 (91), (1919) 7 CALIF. L. REv. 343.
51. McCune v. Belt, 45 Mo. 174 (1869) (order of signatures in point of time not stated,
McCune v. Belt, 38 Mo. 281 [1866] ; held, that B was entitled to recover in full against A on
the bill) ; Denton v. Lytle, 4 Bush 597, 599 (Ky. 1869).
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(3) Where A is an indorsing payee and B a subsequent indorser. both
signing for the accommodation of a principal, for example, the maker,
drawer or acceptor, who negotiates the instrument to the creditor, the in-
dorsements of A and B are regular in form, since A and B are within the
tenor and their indorsements would be sufficient to effect a transfer of rights
as well as to impose obligations; they are not, however, regular in substance,
because in truth A and B have no rights and no intention of transferring
rights. By the American rule, both at common law and under Section 68
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, A is surety and B subsurety, in the
absence of a sufficiently manifested agreement between them to the contrary;
consequently, on taking up the instrument B succeeds to the holder's rights
under the law merchant 52 and he or his subsequent transferee may recover
from A in full 53 in an action brought on the instrument,54 and A on taking
up the instrument has no right against B even for contribution. 55 For like
reasons, if a blank indorsement of the payee is followed by indorsements of
the names of A and B, who sign for the accommodation of another party,
for example, the maker, drawer, acceptor, indorsing payee, or a subsequent
indorser, 50 the indorsements of A and B are regular in form, though not in
substance. Here also by the American rule, there being no agreement be-
tween them to the contrary, A is surety and B subsurety, both at common
law 5' and under Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. s
In both of these situations the accommodating indorsers are under pre-
cisely similar obligations to the creditor, that is, to pay the creditor if the
52. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 121, providing for the remission of a party sec-
ondarily liable to former rights, does not by the better view exclude succession to rights of
the holder. Chafee, The Reacquiyition of a Negotiable Instruntt by a Prior Party (1921)
21 COL. L. REv. 538.
53. McCarty v. Roots, 21 How. 432 (U. S. 1858) ; Moody v. Findley, 43 Ala. 167 (1869)
(not stated whether indorsements were regular in form or irregular) ; Kirschner v. Conklin,
40 Conn. 77 (1873) ; Scott v. Doneghy, 17 B. Mon. 321 (Ky. 1856) (bill) ; Gasquet v. Oakey,
15 La. (o. s.) 537 (184o) ; Coolidge v. Wiggin, 62 Me. 568 (1873) ; Wescott v. Stevens, 85
Me. 325 (1893) ; Sweet v. McAllister, 86 Mass. 353 (1862) ; Woodward v. Severance, 89
Mass. 340 (1863) ; Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass. 214 (1867) (judgment for later transferee of
B) ; McGurk v. Huggett, 56 Mich. 187 (1885) ; Harrah v. Doherty, III Mich. 175, 69 N. W.
242 (1896) ; Newcomb v. Raynor, 21 Wend. io8 (N. Y. 1839) (release of A held to dis-
charge B) ; Kelly v. Burroughs, lO2 N. Y. 93, 6 N. E. 1O9 (1886) ; Crompton v. Spencer, 20
R. I. 330, 38 At. 1oo2 (1897) ; Marr v. Johnson, 9 Yerg. I (Tenn. 1836) ; see Farmers'
Bank v. Vanmeter, 4 Rand. 553, 563 (Va. 1826) (bill; arguendo) ; Hogue v. Davis, 8 Gratt.
4 (Va. 1851). Contra: Daniel v. McRae, 9 N. C. 590 (1823); Douglas v. Waddle, I Ohio
413, 422 (1824) (approved in Barnet v. Young, 29 Ohio St. 7, 12 [1875]) ; Pitkin v. Flana-
gan, 23 Vt. I6o, 168 (181).
54. Most of the cases cited in the preceding footnote so hold.
55. M'Donald v. Magruder, 3 Pet. 470 (U. S. 1830) ; Willis v. Willis, 42 W. Va. 522, 26
S. E. 515 (1896). Contra: Richards v. Simms, 18 N. C. 48 (1834).
Moreover, if the bolder materially alters the indorsement of A, e. g., by addition of the
words "without recourse", or if A does so with the consent of the holder, B is discharged.
See Freile v. Rudiger, 89 N. J. Eq. 91, 94, 1O4 Atl. 142, 144 (1917), modified on other grounds
in 9o N. J. Eq. 248, 251, io6 Atl 410, 411 (1919).
56. Church v. Barlow, 26 Mass. 547 (183o).
57. Church v. Barlow, 26 Mass. 547 (1830) ; Lewis v. Monahan, 173 Mass. 122, 53 N.
E. 150 (1899).
58. Gambrell v. McKean, 28 Ariz. 427, 432, 237 Pac. 196, 198 (925).
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maker of the note or drawee of the bill does not pay, provided, of course,
that the diligence required by the law merchant is used. So were the indorser
and drawer in paragraph (2) of this sub-topic. Hence the rule of subsurety-
ship cannot be predicated on any difference between their obligations to the
creditor, as it could in Class I. It must be supported on the reasoning set
forth in the last sub-topic.
(4) Where A and B were both irregular indorsers, there was great
diversity of decision at common law as to the capacity in which they were
bound to the creditor. The typical case of irregular indorsement was that
in which A and B were not themselves within the tenor of a note, and hence
could not have been owners and transferors thereof, but merely signed their
names on it before effective delivery thereof to the creditor with the intention
of being bound to him. (a) In many states, including Massachusetts, Mary-
land and Ohio, A and B were held, at least prima facie, to be bound as joint
or joint and several makers with the person who signed the note as maker,"
and who was usually the principal. Hence, in such jurisdictions A and B
were prima facie co-sureties. 60  (b) In many other states, including New
York, Oregon and Pennsylvania, A and B were held to be bound to the credi-
tor as indorsers.6 ' In such states, there was a conflict of authority as to
whether the American rule as to successive parties should be applied.6 2 Here
the second, though not the first of the two reasons, set forth in the last
sub-topic, is pertinent, and it would seem that the rule of subsuretyship, once
received, might well have been extended to cover this situation as well as
indorsements regular in form. (c) In Illinois, A and B were held to be
bound to the creditor prima facie as guarantors,6 3 and, since a guaranty is
not an obligation of the law merchant, the American rule would seem
to have been inapplicable.6 4  Under Sections 63 and 64 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, A and B are bound to the creditor as indorsers, and by
virtue of Section 68 "as respects one another are liable prima facie in the
59. 1 AMES, CASES ON BILLS AND NOTES (1894) 269 n. I; I DANIEL, NEGOTiABLE IN-
STRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) § 713a; 2 RANDOLPH, Op. Cit. supra note 40, §§ 831-833.
6o. Keyser v. Warfield, IoO Md. 72, 59 At. 189 (I9O4), 1O3 Md. 161, 63 Atl. 217 (19o6)
(indorsers held to be liable as co-makers with the principal and therefore prima facie related
as co-sureties; case twice reversed on other grounds) ; Logan v. Ogden, IO Tenn. 392, 47
S. W. 489 (1898) (alternative decision). Cf. Camp v. Simmons, 62 Ga. 73 (1878), 64 Ga.
726 (I88O), and Shufelt v. Moore, 93 Mich. 564, 53 N. W. 722 (1892). Contra: Porter v.
Huie, 94 Ark. 333, 126 S. W. 1O69, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1039 (1910) ; and see Thompson v.
Taylor, 12 R. I. 1O9 (1878).
61. I AMES, loc. cit. upra note 59; I DANIEL, op. cit. supra note 59, §§ 713d, 713e; 2
RANDOLPH, op. cit. mtpra note 40, § 837.
62. Holding in the affirmative: Porter v. Huie, 94 Ark. 333, 126 S. W. io6g, 28 L. R. A.
(N. s.) lO39 (191o). In the negative: Machado v. Fernandez, 74 Cal. 362, 16 Pac. 19 (1887).
63. I AMES, loc. cit. supra note 59; 2 RANDOLPH, op. cit. supra note 4o, § 838.
64. See Golsen v. Brand, 75 Ill. 148 (1874). Contra: Phillips v. Plato, 42 Hun 189 (N.
Y. 1886) (two judges reasoning that a guaranty in writing on a negotiable instrument is to be
likened to an indorsement, so that the case is similar to cne of successive indorsements).
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order in which they indorse," the result being that B is surety for A as well
as for the principal.6 5
(5) When A is an irregular indorser and is legally bound to the credi-
tor as indorser, and B is a regular indorser, subsequent to A in time and
position, both indorsing for the accommodation of a principal, B is surety
for A as well as for the principal. 6
Certain situations remain to be considered in which the order of in-
dorsements in point of position on the instrument does not correspond with
the order in time:
(a) If IlM made a note payable to the order of A, and B first indorsed it,
and thereafter A indorsed his name above that of B, both indorsing for the
accommodation of M, there were cases before the Negotiable Instruments
Law holding that A was prima facie liable to B. Now B did not impliedly
stipulate that A should sign above his name, because, while it was contem-
plated that A would sign somewhere (since otherwise the creditor would not
fall within the tenor), still he might sign below the name of B instead of
above it. Hence it became important to determine in what capacity B was
bound to the creditor. The Massachusetts court, recognizing that its doc-
trine of co-makership was contrary to intention, and being reluctant to
extend it to this situation, chose to look at the sequence of indorsements
as they appeared on the instrument at the time of delivery and so was able
to bind A as first indorser and B as second, both indorsements being regular
in form; 67 hence A was prima facie liable to B. Under Section 68 of the
65. Prestenbach v. Mansur, I4 La. App. 42c,, 25 So. 310, 129 So. 445 (1930) ; Cohn v.
Hitt, 133 Tenn. 466, 182 S. W. 235 (ii6).
66. Moore v. Cushing, 162 Mass. 594, 39 N. E. T77 (i895) (Holmes, J., treating A as
indorser rather than co-maker, perhaps because of MASS. PUB. STAT. c. 67, § 15, which en-
titled him to diligence) ; Enterprise Brewing Co. v. Canning, 210 Mass. 285, 96 N. E. 673
(19II) (under N. I. L.). Contra: Cogswell v. Hayden, 5 Ore. 22 (1873).
Under the rules which prevailed in Massachusetts at common law, A was bound as co-
maker with M, both in respect to the creditor, C, and the surety, B. Consequently, (i) A was
liable to C without presentment made to M or notice of dishonor given to A, and B was not
liable to C without presentment made to both M and A (Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. 5o4
[Mass. 1845]) ; and (2) B was -surety for A as well as for M, as was shown under Class I
(Mulcare v. Welch, i6o Mass. 58, 35 N. E. 97 [1893], Knowlton, J., regarding A as co-
maker).
Obviously, if A indorses an instrument before its effective delivery to the payee and
thereby becomes bound to the latter for the accommodation of the maker, drawer, or acceptor,
and the payee indorses and sells the instrument and later takes it up, he is remitted to his
former rights and may recover in full and from A. Schneider v. Mueller, 82 N. J. L. 503,
81 Atl. 863 (1911).
67. Stimson v..Silloway, 79 Mass. 405 (186o), in which case, in an action brought by the
creditor against B, judgment for the latter was affirmed on the ground that he was bound as
indorser and therefore entitled to diligence.
68. Powers v. Eastman, 79 Mass. 405 (286o) ; Clapp v. Rice, 79 Mass. 403 (1859). And
see Lewis v. Monahan, 173 Mass. 122, 53 N. E. 15o (1899). Likewise, in a jurisdiction fol-
lowing the New York view that such an indorser could be bound only as a second indorser
regular in form, a court would naturally be willing to disregard order in time and be content
with an indorsement of A appearing on the instrument before or even after that of B. Cogs-
well v. Hayden, 5 Ore. 22 (1873) (citing Bacon v. Burnham, 37 N. Y. 614 [i868], a very
different case, however).
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Negotiable Instruments Law, A and B are prima facie liable between them-
selves in the order of their indorsements in point of time, so that A on prov-
ing that he indorsed last would be entitled to full recovery from B.69 This
seems a proper result, since under Sections 63 and 64 an irregular indorser
is bound as indorser and directly to the creditor and thus the dilemmas aris-
ing from the earlier Massachusetts and New York rules are avoided.
(b) If M made a note payable to the order of A and A first indorsed
it, and thereafter B indorsed it but placed his name above that of A, it was
said 70 that in Massachusetts the sequence of indorsements as they appeared
on the instrument would control, so that B would be an irregular indorser
and bound as co-maker, 71 and hence prima facie liable to A. Of course,
under Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, indorsers being prima
facie liable among themselves in the order in which they sign, B would be
surety for A as well as for the principal.
Class II. Inconsistent Understandings between the Respective Sureties and
the Creditor or Principal
If A first signs and parts with the instrument, having an understanding
with P, the principal, that he shall be co-surety with B or with some person
then undisclosed or undetermined, 72 and B thereafter signs the instrument
stipulating with P 7a that he shall be surety for both, the relation of sub-
suretyship is created in accordance with the understanding of B.74 The
reason is not that A by so signing and parting with the instrument represents
that he and P are co-principals, for the fact that two persons are joint or
joint and several promisors does not import co-principalship. 5 Nor is the
Of course, different results were attained in Massachusetts in a case where A indorsed
the instrument for the accommodation of M, the maker, before its effective delivery to B, the
payee, who subsequently indorsed it for discount by placing his signature above that of A. A
was bound as co-maker to B and his transferee (Pearson v. Stoddard, 75 Mass. 199 [1857]),
and on taking up the note B was remitted to his former rights and entitled to full recovery
against A (Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass. 179 [1868]).
69. This proposition is recognized in Wittemann v. Sands, 238 N. Y. 434, 144 N. E. 671,
37 A. L. R. 1222 (924), although the decision was that the relation was one of co-suretyship
because of extrinsic agreement to that effect.
7o. See Knowlton, J., in Mulcare v. Welch, i6o Mass. 58, 61, 35 N. E. 97 (1893).
71. This would seem to be an unfortunate conclusion since it bound B in a capacity never
contemplated, and deprived him of diligence before MAss. PuB. STAT. c. 67, § 15.
72. The fact that A required P to procure the signature of B, or was assured by him that
this would be done, indicates that A stipulated for co-suretyship at least; A would generally
have no other interest in the matter.
73. It would seem that an understanding with C, the creditor, or any other participating
party, would be equally effective.
74. Bobbitt v. Shryer, 7o Ind. 513, 517 (188o) (P represented to B that he and A were
co-principals) ; Huffman v. Manley, 83 W. Va. 503, 98 S. E. 613 (1919) (P represented that
he and A were co-principals). Also, other authorities cited pa'ssim in this sub-topic. Contra:
Crouse v. Wagner, 41 Ohio St. 470 (1885) ; Notes (1894) 21 L. R. A. 247; (i93o) 65 A. L.
R. 829. A fortiori, the understanding of B will govern if A had reason to know or expect it.
Wells v. Miller, 66 N. Y. 255 (1876).
75. Suretyship of one for the other is at least equally probable. Distinguish a case of
joint or joint and several obligors who are sureties for the same principal; co-suretyship is
then imported, for such is the normal situation.
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reason that A has caused P to represent to B that A is co-principal with P
or that he consents to be a surety interposed between P and B,76 but rather
that he has placed it in the power of P to make an effective expressed or im-
plied representation of such import; for B is naturally thrown off his guard
by the conjuncture of the representation of P with the signature of A appear-
ing on the instrument and thus acts reasonably in believing and relying on
the representation.7 7  This is much the same reasoning as sustains the well-
established rule which would bind A to C, the creditor, even in the case of
a nonnegotiable instrument, although P should forge the signature of B.78
It follows that B may be subsurety even though he was informed extrinsi-
cally that A signed as surety for P,19 or even though "surety" accompanied
the signature of A.80
In like manner and for a like reason, if A signs having an understand-
ing with P that he shall be surety for B, and B thereafter signs with the
stipulation that he shall be co-surety with A or surety for A, that stipulation
controls the relation between them."'
Of course, if B has knowledge or notice thereof, the understanding of
A will control their relation. 82  Thus, if A indorses a note reading, "We, P
and B, promise" etc., and B subsequently signs it as co-maker, the form of
the note and indorsement gives him constructive notice of A's understand-
ing that he would be surety for B, and that understanding will determine
their relation.8 3  Likewise, in McCollum v. Boughton 84 A had executed a
It must be conceded, however, that in some cases courts have proceeded on the ground of
a representation of co-principalship, e. g., Keith v. Goodwin, 31 Vt. 268, 275 (1858) ; Bob-
bitt v. Shryer, 70 Ind. 513, 517 (188o) ; McMahan v. Geiger, 73 Mo. 145, 150 (1880).
Of course, if A signs a negotiable note payable to P for the latter's accommodation, and
B later signs as co-maker relying on P's statement that the note was given for consideration
and that B's signature is to aid P in negotiating it, A will be estopped to deny the import of
the note that he was already obligated to P and will be refused contribution. Melms v. Wer-
dehoff, 14 Wis. 18 (i86i).
76. Furthermore, it cannot be justly claimed that A should be interposed because he could
have protected himself by taking the unusual precaution of signing as "surety with B" or
"surety with all later signers"; nor because A assumed more risk than B in that A trusted to
the assurance of P that he would get the signature of B and have a consistent understanding
with him, whereas B trusted only to the word of P that he had a consistent understanding
with A; for A's trust as to B's signature was fulfilled.
77. See Huffman v. Manley, 83 W. Va. 503, 98 S. E. 613 (,919).
78. Note (igoo) 49 L. R. A. 315; AmEs, CASES ON SuRanvsmr (i9oi) 311, n. 6; CAMP-
BELL, CASES ON SURETSHIP (1931) 346, n. 2.
79. Baldwin v. Fleming, go Ind. 177 (1883) ; Moynihan v. McKeon, 16 Misc. 343, 38 N.
Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
8o. Adams v. Flanagan, 36 Vt. 400 (1863). While the word "surety" refutes co-princi-
palship, it imports nothing as to the expected relation between A and B.
81. Keeton v. Owens, 228 Ky. 522, 526, 15 S. W. (2d) 487, 488 (1929) (co-suretyship).
See Moynihan v. McKeon, 16 Misc. 343, 38 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (subsuretyship).
82. Paul v. Berry, 78 I1. 158 (1875) (B subsequently ratified his purported signature
with knowledge that A had signed on the assurance that B was principal) ; Moynihan v. Mc-
Keon, 16 Misc. 343, 346, 38 N. Y. Supp. 61, 64 (Sup. Ct. 1896). And even though B merely
has reason to know of A's understanding, it seems that B's position should be no better than
that of co-surety.,
83. B should be concluded by the import of the indorsement as much as a bona fide pur-
chaser would be.
84. 132 Mo. 6ol, 620, 30 S. W. 1028, 33 S. W. 476, 34 S. W. 480, 481 (I896).
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deed of trust of her land reciting that it secured a note made by P and B
and providing for release on payment of the note and for foreclosure on
nonpayment; P, the principal and the husband of A, showed the deed of trust
to B, who signed the note as co-maker relying on the assurance of P that lie
should have recourse to the deed of trust. B bought the land at foreclosure
sale. In an action of ejectment brought by B against A, judgment was given
for A, it being held in effect that A was real subsurety for B, and properly
so, for the deed of trust imported that A was undertaking risk in respect to
her land in behalf of B as well as P,15 and B was concluded by the terms of
the deed.
The last case calls attention to the fact that the general rules of this
sub-topic should also apply when A and B sign different instruments,
provided that the one signed by A is shown to B, who executes the other in
reliance on it.s6
In most of the cases falling within this sub-topic, A and B are joint or
joint and several promisors. Sometimes, however, they are respectively
successive parties to a negotiable instrument. If the obligation of B is con-
ditioned on nonperformance by A, the instrument imports an understanding
had by B that he shall be surety for A, which will fortify a like extrinsic
understanding or will suffice for subsuretyship even in the absence thereof. ST
A different situation is presented, however, when the obligation of B is not
so conditioned, for example, when they are successive indorsers and hence
are each obligated to pay if the maker or drawee does not pay. Of course, if
B has an extrinsic understanding of subsuretyship, its effect is not lessened
by the form of the instrument; on the other hand, if B had no such extrinsic
understanding, it is submitted that the form of the instrument is not suffi-
cient to make him a subsurety, although there are authorities to the con-
trary."' The reasoning of the present sub-topic stops far short of that
result, for it rests on the facts of representation to and reliance of B in the
particular case. Nor can one apply the reasoning hereinbefore set forth in
the sub-topic relating to successive parties on negotiable instruments. The
law need not and should not give effect to the normal expectation of succes-
85. The majority of the court recognized this fact (three judges dissenting), and rea-
soned that it alone fixed the relation between A and B, and that no parol understanding could
have legal effect on the relation in view of the statute permitting a married woman to charge
her property only by deed.
86. It seems that it is not enough that P tells B that he had such an instrument and that
A consents, etc. True, P could and would have produced the instrument on call of B. But re-
liance of B on the wholly oral assurances of P would be unreasonable and unjustified. At all
events, B should be concluded by the import of the first instrument, whether he saw it or not.
87. See Moynihan v. McKeon, I6 Misc. 343, 38 N. Y. Supp. 6i (Sup. Ct. i896) (A
maker, B indorser).
88. Lewis v. Monahan, I73 Mass. 122, 53 N. E. i5o (1899) ; Harrah v. Doherty, Iii
Mich. 175, 69 N. W. 242 (i896).
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sive parties when either has stipulated for a different relation.s° Indeed, it
seems that their relation should be determined by the understanding had by
A, whether it be of co-suretyship or subsuretyship. Thus justice is done to
A without apparent injustice to B.
III. Controlling Agreement between the Sureties
In all the situations discussed under Class II of the previous sub-topic
(where there is no understanding with the principal or creditor), an agree-
ment between the two sureties will control their relation and rights of
recourse inter se, for example, an agreement of co-suretyship, or to con-
tribute in equal or other specified shares. This proposition received almost
universal acceptance at common law and is incorporated in Section 68 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law as far as successive indorsements are con-
cerned.90  The agreement may be oral. The parol evidence rule is not vio-
lated inasmuch as the instrument integrates the undertakings of the sureties
to the creditor rather than any understanding between the sureties them-
selves. Nor is the Statute of Frauds applicable since the oral promise of one
surety to the other for contributory or even full reimbursement may be
legitimately used to fix the relation between them, the result being that the
action may be properly rested on the relational right arising by operation of
law. 9 The agreement may be expressed, or implied from conduct or cir-
8g. Nor does the fact of normal expectation give rise to an inference or presumption that
B so stipulated with P; expectation is different from stipulation.
go. See many authorities cited passim, and in particular the following authorities appro-
priate to the various paragraphs of sub-topic (II), Class (II) (B), supra p. 334.
(3) Blumberg v. Speilberger, 209 Ala. 278, 96 So. I91 (1923) ; Gambrell v. McKean,
28 Ariz. 427, 237 Pac. ig6 (1925) ; Trego v. Estate of Cunningham, 267 Ill. 367, ioS N.
E. 5o (1915) ; Shea v. Vahey, 215 Mass. 8o, 1O2 N. E. ii (1913) (four sureties; agree-
ment of one to contribute one-third) ; Quackenboss v. Harbaugh, 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W.
940 (1923); National Newark Banking Co. v. Sweeney, 88 N. J. L. 14o, 96 Atl. 86
(1915). Certain New Jersey decisions to the contrary, now abrogated by the Negotiable
Instruments Law, are collected in Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 645, 66 Atl. 413,
415 (1907).
(4) Quackenboss v. Harbaugh, 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W. 940 (1923) (agreement of
co-suretyship) ; Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 64o, 66 Atl. 413 (1907) (agreement that
B should indemnify A).
(5) Niagara County Nat. Bank v. La Port, 141 Misc. 327, 251 N. Y. Supp. 759
(Sup. Ct. 193r), 233 App. Div. 501, 253 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th Dep't 1931).
In Wittemann v. Sands, 238 N. Y. 434, 441, 144 N. E. 671, 673 (1924), A was an irregu-
lar indorser and B a later payee-indorser, both for the accommodation of another; it was
held that on taking up the instrument B should be confined to contribution from A since there
were circumstances from which an agreement of contribution should be implied. The court
reasoned that §§ 64 and 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law governed; that § 68 expressly
permitted proof of an agreement negativing subsuretyship and that § 64 (I) must receive a
like interpretation although the language is that, "if the instrument is payable to the order
of a third person," the irregular indorser "is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties".
91. Quackenboss v. Harbaugh, 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W. 940 (1923) (oral agreement for
contribution made by B with A; A was first irregular indorser on some notes, and first in-
dorser regular in form on others) ; Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 644, 66 Atl. 413, 415
(i9o7) (oral promise of full reimbursement; distinguishing Apgar v. Hiler, 24 N. J. L. 812
[1854] from Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. 3. L. 627, 50 Atl. 454, 55 L. R. A. 2o6 [19O]) ;
Easterly v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 433 (1876) ; Edmondson v. Ballard, 149 Va. 798, 141 S. E. 776
(1928); see Handsaker v. Pedersen, 71 Wash. 218, 224, 128 Pac. 230, 232 (I912) (oral
agreement of full indemnity). Note (i93O) 65 A. L. R. 822, 827.
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cumstances. 92  The burden of establishing a controlling agreement between
the sureties rests on the surety who asserts it.
9 3
A few situations deserve special treatment:
(i) If all the sureties are shareholders of the principal corporation,
or perhaps if all are directors, their common benefit or responsibility indicates
an agreement to contribute or to be co-sureties,9 or at least to be jointly
bound so that co-suretyship ensues prima fade.9 5  The inference is suffi-
ciently strong not only to make the evidence competent, but also to justify
submission of the question of such agreement to the jury and to sustain
a finding thereof, 96 and by some authorities even to make out a prima facie
case of such agreement.97  Contribution is usually in equal shares without
regard to the respective holdings of stock,98 unless there was an agreement
for a different ratio.
99
(2) A present or past mutual agreement between A and B to be or to
become sureties for the principal, as distinguished from agreements to that
effect between the respective sureties and the creditor or principal, would
seem normally to import an understanding of co-suretyship and even to raise
a prima facie presumption to that effect.100
92. This proposition is sustained by the great weight of authority. Cases cited passim;
Note (1921) Ii A. L. R. 1332. There are a few cases contra, e. g., In re McCord, 174 Fed.
72 (S. D. N. Y. i9o9) ; and see Johnson v. Crane, 16 N. H. 68, 74 (1844) (now overruled
on this point by Paul v. Rider, 58 N. H. i1g [1877]).
93. Hagerthy v. Phillips, 83 Me. 336, 22 Atl. 223 (18qx) ("the burden of proof lies
heavily upon the plaintiff", the person asserting the agreement) ; Freile v. Rudiger, 89 N. J.
Eq. 91, 93, 104 Atl. 142, 143 (1917) ; Edmondson v. Ballard, 149 Va. 798, 141 S. E. 776 (1928)
(oral agreement to indorse and contribute). See Shea v. Vahey, 215 Mass. 80, 82, io2 N. E.
119 (1913).
94. Gambrell v. McKean, 28 Ariz. 427, 237 Pac. I96 (1925) ; Trego v. Estate of Cun-
ningham, 267 Ill. 367, io8 N. E. 5o (1915) ; Marquardt's Estate, 251 Pa. 73, 95 Atl. 917
(i915) (notes made by A, indorsed by B, payee, and also by C, D, and E, all being direc-
tors, in pursuance of mutual agreement thus to become sureties). Note (1921) II A. L. R.
1332.
95. Trego v. Estate of Cunningham, 267 Ill. 367, io8 N. E. 5o (1915) ; Holston v. Haley,
125 Me. 485, 490, 135 Atl. 98, ioo (1926) (held sufficient to sustain finding of joint liability
by trial court) ; Quackenboss v. Harbaugh, 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W. 940 (1923) ; Strasburger
v. Strasburger & Co., Inc., 167 App. Div. 198, 152 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dep't 1915) (held
sufficient to take case to jury on question of joint liability). Note (I92I) ii A. L. R. 1332,
1335.
96. See Paul v. Rider, 58 N. H. n9 (1877), in which case evidence that A and B in-
dorsed for the accommodation of their sons, who were partners, was held competent as tend-
ing to show an agreement of co-suretyship between A and B because of their common interest.
97. Marquardt's Estate, 251 Pa. 73, 95 Atl. 917 (1915). But see Mann v. Bradshaw's
Admr., 136 Va. 351, 371, 372, i18 S. E. 326, 332, 333 (923) (holding no prima facie case,
and that inference was rebutted by evidence of designed order of signing).
98. See ANN. CAS. igi6B, 361, 362.
99. Wilmarth v. Hartman, 238 Mich. 20, 213 N. W. 73 (1927); ANN. CAs. 19i6B, 361,
362.
ioo. Macdonald v. Whitfield, 8 App. Cas. 733, 738, 747 (P. C. 1883) (previous agreement
between directors to become sureties for principal corporation); Weaver-Dowdy Co. v.
Brewer, 127 Ark. 462, 192 S. W. 9o2 (917) (sureties signing on same occasion) ; Love v.
Wall, 8 N. C. 313 (1821) (previous agreement) ; Marquardt's Estate, 251 Pa. 73, 95 Atl.
917 (I915) (previous agreement among directors of principal corporation to become sureties
for it) ; Logan v. Ogden, ioi Tenn. 392, 47 S. W. 489 (I898) (sureties signing on same occa-
sion). See Blumberg v. Speilberger, 2o9 Ala. 278, 96 So. 191 (0923) ; 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRAcrs (i92o) § 1262. Contra: Gasquet v. Oakey, i5 La. (o. s.) 537 (184o) (M, A, and B
NONCONSENSUAL SUBSURETYSHIP
(3) In the case of renewal notes, the sequence of the undertakings of
the sureties on the last renewal is determinative. 10 1 Of course, the order of
undertakings on a prior instrument, or an understanding between the sureties
in respect to a prior instrument, is admissible in evidence as tending to show
that the same relation was intended to exist at the time of the last renewal.
But the mere fact that in a series of renewal notes A and B signed in varying
order in time and position, or either, has been held not to import co-surety-
ship, the reason given being that the change in order may reasonably be
attributed to a refusal on the part of B otherwise to renew the note."0 2 On
the other hand, such variation in order might well be thought to indicate
an indifference to be accounted for only by a continuing mutual agreement
of co-suretyship.
103
(4) The fact that A and B each subsequently paid or agreed to pay
one-half of the amount of the instrument to the creditor has been held to
import prima facie an original agreement to contribute.
104
(5) The fact that .3 signed with knowledge that the creditor had re-
fused to accept an instrument bearing the signatures only of the principal
and A has been held to indicate that B intended to be surety for both. 105
NOTE: The second part of Professor Campbell's article will appear
in the February issue of the REVIEW.
purchased land as co-tenants, each giving his note for one-third of the purchase price in-
dorsed by the other two; an agreement between A and B to be sureties for M on the particu-
lar note was necessarily involved) ; Aiken v. Barkley, 2 Speers L. 747 (S. C. 1844). In the
latter case the court reasoned that certainty in mercantile dealings required that sureties make
a choice of two methods: a joint undertaking, involving co-suretyship prima facie, and suc-
cessive undertakings, involving subsuretyship prima facie.
ioi. Pomeroy v. Clark, I MacArth. 6o6 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1874); Enterprise Brewing Co.
v. Canning, 210 Mass. 285, 287, 96 N. E. 673, 674 (1911).
lO2. Enterprise Brewing Co. v. Canning, 210 Mass. 285, 96 N. E. 673 (1911) ; Kirschner
v. Conklin, 40 Conn. 77 (873) (variation in time only).
103. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1262.
io4. Talcott v. Cogswell, 3 Day 512 (Conn. i8o7) ; Denton v. Lytle, 4 Bush 597 (Ky.
1869). Contra: Harrah v. Doherty, III Mich. 175, 178, 69 N. W. 242, 243 (1896) (alterna-
tive decision). Cf. Johnson v. Crane, 16 N. H. 68, 74 (1844) (jury found otherwise).
105. Thompson v. Taylor, 12 R. I. io9 (1878).
